An Historical-Critical Evaluation of
Aquinas' Argument for the Existence of God.
Frank David Chance

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When reading and evaluating the Summa Theologica[1]using the historical-critical methodology, it becomes readily apparent that the text for the Summa was written for that particular period of time to the people of that time based on their relevant preconceived ideas of God. From Augustine’s restless heart theory and his questions regarding what Athens had to offer Jerusalem from The City of God and Anselm’s ontological argument, we see some progressive innovations occurring.  Plato’s (The Philosopher) metaphysics also play a great part in establishing Aquinas’ argument for the existence as his quotes and references to Plato are pervasive throughout the Summa Theologica. Aquinas was very much a literalist in his writings and interpretations.

In using the historical-critical method of looking a piece, we must establish some criteria for evaluating the particular piece of literature we are analyzing. Five points exist in this methodology:

1.      We must understand the nature and background of the author.

2.      We must understand the environment (socio-political and religious society) of his time.

3.      We must acknowledge the people to whom it is written and why it was written to those people.

4.      We must understand the context of the writings. (Use of literary techniques)

5.      We must understand the author’s intent to accomplish the four previous criteria.

By using these criteria, we can establish a deeper understanding of his philosophical viewpoints in relation to his culture and environment. Having established these evaluators, we can begin by looking at these five criteria in earnest before looking at my interpretation of Aquinas argument for the existence of God. My comments and philosophical conclusions will appear at the end of this piece, as will most of the references needed to substantiate my conclusions.  Let us turn now to five criteria.

1.  Thomas was reportedly born in 1227 but there is evidence of a 1225 birth. He died in at the monastery at Fossanova in 1274. This is, according to William Tyndale’s timeline, as the pre-Reformation period. Near the end of 1244, he was sent to Cologne, France to study under Albert Magnus.  Albert Magnus taught and guided Aquinas until 1252.  Two things are evident here that affected Aquinas throughout his life;

           i.       His association with the polyhistor (??) during his development period influenced him greatly.

           ii.       This association also left Aquinas with a permanently imbued Aristotelian methodology for his works.

2.  We can see that the societal, political and religious environment was strongly Dominican Roman Catholic. It should be mentioned that during the 1250’s and onward mendicant orders were beginning to rise and Aquinas encountered difficulty until moving to Rome at the behest of Pope Urban IV. Interestingly enough in The Oxford History of Christian Worship the following notes appear:

“Christ seemed to overwhelm all other themes in Christian piety. Christ’s wounds, particularly the effusion of his blood, became common themes in the art, poetry and music of late medieval Christianity. For example, the famed Eucharistic hymn Adoro te devote, attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas, speaks of Christ as the “Pious Pelican” (Pie pelicane Jesu Domine).[2]

“While Scholasticism generated a rational, Aristotelian paradigm of theology, popular culture continued to witness the production of crude Eucharistic “miracle stories” that prominently featured flesh and blood appearing in place of the consecrated elements. These crass legends usually involved the chastisement of some cynical Christian or unbelieving Jew, who, to his or her sorrow, witnessed the transformation of a Eucharistic host into a bloody mass of flesh.”[3]

3.  To whom it was written and why it was written to them was the Roman Catholic grip and the rise of mendicant orders that were causing serious problems for the established church.  As the above quotation indicates, alluding to this point, Aquinas was beginning to see a divergence in this period and his Aristotelian influence was showing through. Again, The Oxford History of Christian Worship comments on the Fourth Lantern Council;

“Yet at the turn of the thirteenth century, when the Latin Church offered a dogmatic proclamation of what Roman Catholics must believe about the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, it employed this scholastic neologism. The Fourth Lantern Council (1215) employed the term to “settle” thorny theological debates about the mystery of ethereal presence and to counter the heterodox beliefs of the Cathars or Albigensians, who denied the validity of priestly ministry and any sort of real presence in the sacraments. The council declared:

“‘There is truly one universal Church of the faithful, outside of   which no one can be saved; in this Church Jesus Christ is the priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearance of bread and wine, with the blood transubstantiated into his Body and wine into his Blood by divine power.’ ”[4] [5]

Very briefly, the context of his writings, as mentioned earlier, were strongly Aristotelian in nature and his presentations were well structured and his interpretations were literal in nature. He also possessed a touch of Augustinian philosophy when it came to faith, reason, and how each are discerned.

4.  Aquinas’ writings took on many aspects depending upon whose philosophical standards you apply. I feel that the Summa Theologica belonged to the literary works that expose a dogmatic, apologetic, and ethical genre. I have no other reason to offer any other writing styles.

5.  Aquinas was a Church father, teacher, Dominican, and a Master Parisian. Looking at these identities, we can say that the compilation of the Summa Theologica was an intellectual effort to foster Church canons, albeit with an Anselm and Aristotelian twist. The Summa Theologica appeal was virtually universal in scope to the Church and to the developing Scholasticism of the pre-Reformation period. 

The Summa Theologica: Question 2, the Existence of God (Three Articles)

I see no apparent reason to show the Objections, as they exist, for the replies are what we are interested in, in order, to evaluate his thoughts and interpretations.  It is apparent that the objections seem to work hand in glove with the replies and contrary statements, almost by design.

“THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)

“Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence or, rather, what is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) whatever concerns His operations---namely, His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?

(2) Whether it is demonstrable?

(3) Whether God exists?”[6]

Note the three fold divisions in which Aquinas breaks this down for his discussions. I believe this is indicative of an organized intelligent mind, tempered with a Dominican Catholicism and Aristotelian overtones.

I am looking at his replies to “Whether the existence of God is self-evident.”[7]

“I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom, the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore, I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q[3], A[4]). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.”[8]

Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.”[9]

Here Aquinas introduces his philosophy of faith and reason mentioned earlier. We can also see at this point the Aristotelian influence with the first principles of demonstration. My only question at this point is the term “effects” in the last sentence of “I answer that,” as in my opinion Aquinas brings the aspect of degrees of self-evident effects.  Aquinas is also smart enough and forthcoming enough to see that things of nature are naturally observable to man. I agree with in the totality of the concept and the varying degrees of knowledge that he intimates in man. There is no way, in my opinion that we can know that God exists absolutely except by His effects. Some of these effects are readily apparent to us; and some of these known only to us in degrees of effects and causality. I also contend that this is a first evidence of sense perception and relativity to the existence of God. I am concerned about the plausibility of Damascene’s statement (De Fide Orth. I, 1, 3) wherein he states, “the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all, by today’s standards it is a plausible argument. (Luke 1:35-45-KJV) Aquinas states that “To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, in as much as God is man’s beatitude.” He, then, goes to man naturally desiring corporeal happiness. The last part of the reply to objection discusses the carnality of man and his pleasures. I agree with the sense perception argument but not the linguistic verbiage he uses in “naturally”.  Natural knowledge from the womb to death comes in a variety of ways, not the least of which is social and environmental conditioning. The extent of this sense perception and socialization process we go through dictate the degrees of things self-evident. The use of the word beatitude to describe man’s happiness as supreme (By definition of beatitude) would indicate an absolute perfection of happiness, and we can never achieve absolute anything. We can only hope to achieve that modicum.

“Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.”[10]

Note here, the emergence of Anselm’s influence on Aquinas through his ontological argument for the existence of God.  We also see the “rationalizing” of the word God between the physical aspects and the mental aspects.  With these aspects expounded, we can see a move toward man having preconceived sensory and holographic images of what God “seems” to be in his own individual mind.  Aquinas continues to look at what a word signifies with no mention of the individuality of concepts that a single man would have.  Lastly, Aquinas signals the difference in atheistic and religious interpretations of God stated in the last sentence of reply to objection 2. 

“Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.”[11]

Thomas is succinct in his interpretation of self-evident truth and rationality versus a Primal Truth, which is not self-evident to us. A lot is assumed relative to faith and reason and explanation should have been forthcoming. Let us look at what I consider a reasonable explanation looking at the five elements in the preface regarding the nature of the times of Aquinas.

“Even in the face of a conciliar decree promulgated by a pope of Innocent III’s statue, theologians continued to disagree about the precise meaning of the term “transubstantiation”, since the terms “substance” and “accidents” were still open to a variety of philosophical interpretations. But, the Latin theologians’ penchant for precision was animated and tremendously enriched by the reception, in the university milieu, of the full Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation. Natural theology could now become the handmaiden of systematic Christian theology, moving the discussion to a level that the Carolingian theologians could scarcely have imagined.  Thomas Aquinas, Dominican priest and Parisian master, offered a more systematic and philosophically refined definition of transubstantiation (Part 3, Summa Theologica) than anything put forth by Innocent III or Latern IV.”[12]

We are beginning to see the language and verbiage difficulties arise from the pre-Reformation period as scholasticism starts its rise.

 “Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists?”[13]

In Question 2 Article 2, we begin to see the rise of faith versus reason.  According to Aquinas, faith presupposes natural knowledge and that demonstration of faith can be accomplished with the use of a priori (cause) and a posteriori (effect)

“I answer that; Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect, the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.”[14]

As a side note to the introduction of Reply to Objection 1; the use of Hebrews 11:1 as a justification causes problems. In my opinion, Hebrews 11:3, 6 and/or Romans 8:24-25 offers a better argument for the demonstration that God exists than Hebrews 11:1.

“Reply to Objection 1: The existences of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.”[15]

Digressing, for a moment, to Part 1 Article 1, we will find some additional insight on Aquinas by understanding his philosophical approaches regarding the sacred doctrines. I feel an understanding of this philosophical nature, the Augustinian and Aristotelian influences exerted in his early life, and his conditioning, will shed additional knowledge throughout the Summa Theologica. These aspects will become clearer as the specificity of the questions progresses.  For example, in reading the Summa, I found several items of interest that aided my conclusions in understanding Aquinas’ argument for the existence of God.

“I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Is. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence, it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths, which exceed human reason, should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.”[16]

The quote in “I answer that”, the first sentence, causes me problems particularly the last part of that quote which states, “there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason.” The objection 1 listed in this article are supported by Ecclus.3:22 and 3:25. (This book is not included in the deuterocanonical books.)  “Built up by human reason” causes me problems, as it appears these ideologies are constructed based on the individuality of the philosopher.

Beyond this, I have no other objections to Aquinas reply to this objection. This reply is necessary in our understanding the existence of God. Another analogy that needs mentioning, for understanding the existence of God, involves Part 1, Question 1, and Article 2.

“On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened." But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore, sacred doctrine is a science.

“I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some, which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some, which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus, the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it precedes from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.”[17]

In Part 1, Article 3, we find additional useful information regarding the substantive validation of Aquinas’ arguments.

“I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.”[18]

One further discussion will complete our digression into Part one for understanding Aquinas’ argument on the existence of God.  This will give us some insight from “Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science” (Part 1, Question 1, and Article 4) Aquinas’ reply is:

“On the contrary, every practical science is concerned with human operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore, it is not a practical but a speculative science.

“I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things, which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.”[19]

It is heartening to see Aquinas realize the sciences of precepts, acknowledged in these replies, and the sciences that exist because of the natural light of a higher intelligence are distinct and entities in and of themselves. (Intelligent design!)  (Sounds Pascalian in that the “heart has knowledge of things that reason knows nothing of.”{Paraphrased from Pensees})  Note the thoughts of Augustine in the first paragraph of “On the Contrary” (Part 1, Question1, and Article 2) above from his De Trin. Xiv, 1.

“Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".”[20]

We can see in this reply that Aquinas is differentiating between the word essence (middle term) in the Objection 2 and the word exists as the middle term in the demonstration of the existence of God. He is also bringing into to play the meaning of the word as being different from its essence. I agree with this analogy in the literal sense as it relates to Aquinas’ total presentation.  He has the analogy in the right sequence, in my opinion, as he relates the nature of the word to its essence.  He continues further to say that God, and the many words ascribed to Him, are products of his effects not of His essence. This provides us with the idea that, his effects know God, as we know Him (Christianity).  Therefore, His effects know the knowledge of His essence.

“Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.”[21]

Here, we find that Aquinas does not supply us with the effects that are not proportionate to the causes.  His verbiage indicates that we must know every effect to establish a cause and still we cannot know, perfectly what God is and His essence. Still Aquinas uses this to demonstrate the existence of God in his reply to objection 3.   I contend there are still causes and effects of God that are beyond the reasonable intellectual level of man and his noetic precepts of his religious world-view. (Even if his religious world-view is a subschema of a total world-view)

 

Whether God exists? Part 1, Question 2, and Article 3

We will now look at what I consider the heart of the demonstration for the existence of God according to Aquinas. These “five ways” have stood the test of time and the “Build up of human reason” by the philosophical sciences.  Several articles throughout the Summa Theologica refer to non-deuterocanonical books and I take exception with this usage.  Aquinas was a Dominican and a master Parisian.  As a result, his strong background in Catholicism is leading him into weakened grounds. Augustine indicates (Epis. ad Heiron. XIX, 1) “Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical  have I learned to hold in such honour as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them.  But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning.”  Marcion was called a heretic for his canonization of Scripture, Muratorio finally put together a reasonable compilation that lead to the Bible as we know it through the Festal Letter of Athanasius #39 in 367 A.D.  Point number 7 in this letter opens the door for Aquinas’ Catholicism by,

“But for greater exactness I add this also, writing of necessity, that there are other books besides these not included in the canon, but appointed by the Fathers to be read by those who newly join us; and who wish for instruction in the word of godliness. The Wisdom of Solomon, and the Wisdom of Sirach, and Esther, and Tobit, and that which is called the Teachings of the Apostles, and the Shepherd.  But the former, my brethren, are included in the Canon, the latter being merely read; nor is there in any place the mention of apocryphal writings. But, they are the invention of heretics, who write them when they choose, bestowing upon them their approbation, and assigning to them a date, that so, using them as ancient writings, they may find occasion to lead astray the simple.”[22](Bold Italics are emphasis added by the writer)

The mention of point seven, however, still falls under the original premises listed in the preface regarding the Historical-critical methodology involving the times in which this expose was written.

“On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex. 3:14)

“I answer that; The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. (My emphasis)

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things, which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”[23](All highlighted areas are for added emphasis by the writer) 

In terms of the five ways, let us look at the first cause for the existence of God. Aquinas seems to evaluate motion from both reason and faith as he indicates in his first sentence. The use of the word “senses” and “it is certain” makes this clear. However, when he discusses “potentiality” and “actuality”, the use of wood burning and fire are weak at best. Aquinas throughout the Summa Theologica moves from the abstract to the material worlds with ease but not always fluidly. His analogies are simplistic at best, but I am sure they are a product of the times and the scientific faculties that were available to him in the worlds of physics and mathematics. The two most significant statements in the first way are:

“For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.”[24] 

“Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in potentiality and actuality in the same respect, but only in different respects.”[25]

I agree with Aquinas statement of a first mover based on his analogies, but I fear a discussion will start on the subject with the advent of Newtonian and Einsteinian Mathematics. In his time, this was indicative of the only way to arrive at a first mover.

In Aquinas’ second way, he relates the nature of God based on efficient cause. We see again, the references to sensory perceptions of his analogies. Aquinas’ arguments for the first cause to the immediate cause to the ultimate causes are good. I agree with his concluding sentence of moving towards infinity there would be no first cause, and therefore no ultimate cause, and therefore no God. (Reductio ad Absurdum.)

In the third way, I contend there are some weak areas that need discussing. The first being the conditions set forth in his argument of “possibility” and “necessity”. Semantically, I prefer the word probability as possibility does not connote necessary. Probability tends more toward the essence of necessity as it means something can exist but it does not necessarily have to exist.  I feel this would facilitate a stronger argument for the existence of God (John 1:1-2) in that a First Mover (passé) would not only determine the necessity of existence but the probability of that necessity at some point in time.

In his fourth way, we find that gradation is relevant to the existence of God.  This can be a lot like the third way in that we are looking at degrees of characteristics of “beings”.  Aquinas should not have moved form these perceptual abstracts of the traits of beings into his discussion of fire again.  The fourth way generates the opportunity for discussion due to this movement into the physical world.  Since neither the fall of man, neither, everything is good, nor is it perfection, the point he makes is still valid that the cause of all this essence in beings is God. (See Augustine’s response in Reply to Objection 1, the problem of evil) This leads back to a quote in the fourth way, which Aquinas says,

” Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.[26]

As we can see the “Philosopher” (Aristotle) has an impact here, but I contend that the jumping back and forth in the same sentence from perceived values of beings and their characteristics to the intensity level of fire that is tangibly observed. How “hot” is noblest or truthfulness?  I also contend that the maximum of anything in a genus is the cause of that genus is leading to the argument that heat is the cause of fire and as heat rises, so does the intensity of fire. Fire is an effect of an event and heat is the cause. Heat causes fire in paper (ignites) at 451 degrees Fahrenheit and yet phosphorus ignites because of the heat in a room.

In the fifth way, we see the emergence of governance. In the first sentence, I contend that the “so as to obtain the best result” is too ambiguous.  Yes, the best result may be the “end result”.  However, the “end result” may not always be the best, in terms of good and evil. From here on out in the brief explanation of the fifth way, Aquinas seems on track for the existence of God as the first cause (director) in a non-intelligent body and its movements.

“Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.”[27]

We have seen Aquinas’ development of arguments for the existence of God.  This quote is a summation of the fact that God exists, and it comes from Augustine.  The reality of the use of this particular quote seems to indicate either a shift in Aquinas’ philosophy relative to the Church position or a branching out on his own using the scholasticism approach as his vehicle. (Neo-Aristotelian) The possibility exists that it could be both.  For God to be a first cause, his omnipotence must lead to the cause of all things, good and bad, in order to reach a “best result” end.

“Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.”[28]

This is a “sine qua non” conclusion to the Aquinas’ argument for the existence of God in Article 3. As Anselm said,

“God is that being than whom none greater can be conceived. Now, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived existed only in the intellect, it would not be the absolutely greatest, for we could add to it existence in reality. It follows, then, that the being than whom nothing greater can be conceived, i.e. God, necessarily has real existence.” (Proslogion- 1077-1078)

“We understand God to be the greatest possible being; we agree that if God only exists in our minds, we can imagine a greater being that exists both in the mind and in reality; and since God is, by definition, the greatest possible being, he must exist in our minds and in reality.” (Proslogion- 1077-1078)

                  I am convinced that this reply in Article 3 concludes with just that type of comment from Aquinas, in that he has on either side relative Articles that lead up to and expounds on Question 2, Articles 1, 2, and 3.  Upon looking back at Augustine, Aristotle and Anselm, the influence is dramatic and ebullient in both literary style and content. I also contend that the Summa Theologica could possible have represented two additional constructs. First, and probably most important, is a thought that Aquinas work could have been an epic compilation of religious philosophy and direction for the Church (Roman Catholicism) as mendicant Scholasticism began to grow and spread rapidly. Looking back to Augustine’s era, the formation of Roman Catholicism was beginning to exercise its formative powers from Constantine’s granting Christianity as the religion of the state. The four Bishops consolidated under the Bishop of Rome, as Rome was the head of the western portion of the empire. (Byzantine Empire {Eastern Empire} is at Constantinople) The papal infancy, established at Rome, consolidated the foundation for a Theo-political state.  The Vulgate Bible was “locked up” for the next thousand years. Ecumenical Councils flourished to establish canons “according to the fathers” (quoted earlier from the Summa) which in essence sought to consolidate a power base. In Aquinas’s time, the Church was coming under outside pressure beginning at the University level. (Scholasticism)  As the cultural base expanded rapidly and intellectually into a more diverse conceptualization of the Holy Scriptures and what the Holy Scriptures said, the Church stood to lose its hold. It could have been as simple as the Church was moving in a non-Scriptural direction and establishing canons based on what the Church required to stay in power as the titular head of this Theo-political state.  This represents a conclusion based on reading and conjecture on my studies of the histories of that time.

Secondly, Aquinas’ thoughts were simply a consolidation of Anselm’ and Augustine’s thoughts that were constructed to fit into the Church’s applicative needs during this period as Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics were on the rise. This compilation by Aquinas gave the Church some operating room.  The Roman Catholic Church, in the Twelfth Latern Council, Canon 8 of 70, made use of the Dominicans as a sort of “Gestapo” type inquisitors with an objective of eliminating the heretics and their materials. The Ad Exstirpanda, a papal bull, issued by Pope Innocent IV on May 15, 1252 gave specific orders for the accomplishment of the tasks associated with the use of torture for eliciting confessions from heretics and explicitly condoned the practice of executing relapsed heretics by burning them alive at the stake. This may be used as a side note, but them importance of these events were during the time of Aquinas.  In the preface of this article, I mentioned the movement of Aquinas coincided with the movement of Pope Innocent IV. Pope Alexander IV and Pope Clement IV also signed off on this papal bull on November 30, 1259 and on November 3, 1265, respectively.

 A Conclusion to Question 2: Articles 1, 2, and 3.
 Aquinas’s Argument for the Existence of God.

In summation, I tried to look at the composition, the literary constructs and the philosophy relative to Aquinas’ time and environment. I gave my justification for using the Historical-critical methodology in the preface and except for the comments of my personal philosophical, theological and apologetical beliefs; I contend that Aquinas met his intellectual goals for the existence of God in his arguments. 

"Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo, quia, nisi credidero, non intelligam." ("Nor do I seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe that I may understand. For this too I believe, that unless I first believe, I shall not understand." (Anselm; Cur Deus homo, I. 2 and 38; De Fide Trin, 2.)[29]

As Anselm said,

“We understand God to be the greatest possible being; we agree that if God only exists in our minds, we can imagine a greater being that exists both in the mind and in reality; and since God is, by definition, the greatest possible being, he must exist in our minds and in reality.” (Cur Deus homo, I. 2 and 38; De Fide Trin, 2.)[30]

Aquinas methodology was consistent as he states the question under consideration; presents the arguments he plans to reject; introduces his views and supports them; Argues for his point of view; and criticizes the original question.  His writing style for the Summa is dogmatic, apologetical, and ethical.  He is somewhat philosophical as he started the Summa late in life and completed in a supplement from the letters of Peter Lombard. 

In terms of modern day philosophy, I have evaluated the existence of God from many perspectives in order to establish a link from today backwards to Aquinas. I have perused Albert Schweitzer’s book The Quest for the Historical Jesus and Fritz Schaefer’s lecture at Rice University on 02/12/05 discussing Steve Hawking’s Quantum Cosmology and Post Modernism (Audio lecture). Dr. Edward Martin’s arguments, for the existence of God, in the Secunda Via, in his unpublished manuscript for this course have strong philosophical ties to Aquinas’ arguments. From Francis Schaeffer’s lecture on Naturalistic Science-Poor Science (Veritas Forum), R. A. Torrey[31], Ronald Nash[32], William Rowe[33], and Charles Ryrie[34] all have foundations to one degree or another in Aquinas. (Albeit with a non-Catholic twist)  I have found that, indeed, Thomas Aquinas fulfilled his obligations in writing the Summa Theologica under the criteria we established in the preface. Using a philosophical approach to the Historical-critical methodology, I contend that the arguments for the existence of God in Aquinas’ time and Theo-political state are plausible, definitive, and succinct.  It seems that this piece was not only a foundational piece for the Church but for future philosophic and theological applications and interpretations.  The majority of Aquinas philosophical writings were in the thirteen opuscitla that were commentaries on Aristotle. There were numerous other opuscula, but only fourteen were genuine.  As discussed earlier in previous text these writings were dogmatic (church authoritarian), apologetic (defensive), and ethical (based on the historical, political, and cultural aspects of his societal affiliations).

 Bibliography

Aquinas, Thomas, and St. “The Existence of God (Three Articles).” In Summa Theologica. Compiled by Sandra K. Perry: Perrysburg Ohio, digital. Translated by Fathers of The English Dominican Province. First ed. Calvin College, Ethereal Library: Benziger Brothers, 1947.

 “The Existence of God (Three Articles).” In Summa Theologica. Compiled by Sandra K. Perry: Perrysburg Ohio, digital. Translated by Fathers of The English Dominican Province. First ed. Calvin College, Ethereal Library: Benziger Brothers, 1947.

 “The Existence of God (Three Articles).” In Summa Theologica. Compiled by Sandra K. Perry: Perrysburg Ohio, digital. Translated by Fathers of The English Dominican Province. First ed. Calvin College, Ethereal Library: Benziger Brothers, 1947.

“The Existence of God (Three Articles).” In Summa Theologica. Compiled by Sandra K. Perry: Perrysburg, Ohio, digital. Translated by Fathers of The English Dominican Province. First ed. Calvin College, Ethereal Library: Benziger Brothers, 1947.

“Western Christendom.” In The Oxford History of Western Christianity. Edited by Geoffrey Wainwright and Karen B. Westerfield Tucker. First Ed. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria. “Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Series II, Volume 4,” 02-04-93. Calvin College Ethereal Library. http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-04/Npnf2-04-93.htm.

McCue, James F. “The Doctrine of Transubstantiation from Berenger to the Council of Trent.” Harvard Theological Review, no. 61 (1968).

Nash, Ronald. “Chapter 9; Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God.” In Faith & Reason, first ed. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing, 1988.

Rowe, William. “Article II: Arguments for the Existence of God.” Philosophy of Religion, edited by Robert Ferm-Middlebury College. Second Edition; New York, New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998.

Ryrie, Charles C. “Section II: The living and True God.” In Basic Theology; A Popular Guide to Understanding Biblical Truth, second ed. Chicago, Illinois: Moody Press, 1986, 1999.

Thibodeau, Timothy. “Western Christendom.” In The Oxford History of Western Christianity. Edited by Geoffrey Wainwright and Karen B. Westerfield-Tucker. First Ed. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Torrey, R. A. “Book 1; What the Bible Teaches about God.” In What the Bible Teaches: The Truths of the Bible Made Plain, Simple and Understandable, second ed. Peabody Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 1998, 2002.

 

 Citations 

[1]Thomas Aquinas, and St, “The Existence of God (Three Articles),” in Summa Theologica, comp. Sandra K. Perry: Perrysburg Ohio; digital, trans. Fathers of The English Dominican Province, first ed. (Calvin College, Ethereal Library: Benziger Brothers, 1947), 1.

[2]Timothy Thibodeau, “Western Christendom,” in The Oxford History of Western Christianity, ed. Geoffrey Wainwright and Karen B. Westerfield Tucker, first ed. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 235.  Thibodeau authored this chapter on Western Christendom. Authors in that field wrote each of the 34 chapters.  It is highly Roman Catholic in nature throughout.

[3]Ibid, 236-237.

[4]James F. McCue, “The Doctrine of Transubstantiation from Berenger to the Council of Trent,” Harvard Theological Review, no. 61 (1968): 385-430.

[5]Thibodeau, The Oxford History of Western Christianity, 235.

[6]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[7]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[8]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[9]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[10]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[11]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[12]Timothy Thibodeau, “Western Christendom,” in The Oxford History of Western Christianity, ed. Geoffrey Wainwright and Karen B. Westerfield Tucker, first ed. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 235.  Thibodeau authored this chapter on Western Christendom. An author in that field wrote each of the 34 chapters and it is highly Roman Catholic in nature throughout.

[13]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[14]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[15]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[16]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[17]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[18]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[19]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[20]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[21]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[22]Bishop of Alexandria Athanasius, “Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Series II, Volume 4,” 02-04-93, Calvin College Ethereal Library, http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-04/Npnf2-04-93.htm (accessed January 24, 2006).  From the Paschal festival in 367, whereby he defines canonically what are the divine books accepted by the Church.

[23]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[24]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[25]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[26]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[27]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[28]Aquinas and St, Summa Theologica.

[29]Deus homo, “I. 2 and 38; De Fide Trin: sec. 2.

[30]Ibid.

[31]R. A. Torrey, “Book 1; What the Bible Teaches about God,” in What the Bible Teaches: The Truths of the Bible Made Plain, Simple and Understandable, second ed. (Peabody Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 1998, 2002), 3-54.  A Statement based Scripture supported text discussing God's immutability.

[32]Ronald Nash, “Chapter 9; Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God,” in Faith & Reason, first ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing, 1988), 121-133.  Footnote 6 on page 126 and the text on that page regarding Aquinas' position.

[33]William Rowe, “Article II: Arguments for the Existence of God,” in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Ferm-Middlebury College (Second Edition; New York, New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998), 89-207.  Specifically pages 127-155. Rowe's; "Two Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument on pages 140-155.

[34]Charles C. Ryrie, “Section II: The living and True God,” in Basic Theology; A Popular Guide to Understanding Biblical Truth, second ed. (Chicago, Illinois: Moody Press, 1986, 1999), 31-39.

David Chance is currently a graduate Theology Student at Trinity Theological Seminary, Newburgh IN. He holds a BBA in Management and Marketing from Lamar University and has spent many years as a successful businessman.